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Symbolic Interaction and Social Planning: 
Perspectives from the Early Years1 
 
Roger A. Lohmann 
West Virginia University 
 
Social planning is a concept and a clarion call which has had substantial appeal 
for several generations of American academics and social professionals. In fact, the 
popularity of the idea of planning and the sheer pervasiveness of discussions on this 
subject have led to a number of possible different interpretations (Bailey, 1975; 
Braybrooke & Lindblom, 1963; Bauer, 1963; Encyclopedia, 1968; Friedmann, 1972; 
Kahn, 1967; Lindblom, 1980; Mayer, 1972; Mayer, Moroney & Morris, 1974; Morris, 
Binstock & Rein, 1967). It is possible to identify, for example, at least three distinct 
contemporary approaches to the basic concept and practice of social planning.  
There is the indicators approach of economic planning, wherein social 
phenomena such as poverty, unemployment, retirement and productivity are 
measured within closed systems of standardized statistical indices and the nominal 
objective of planning is to achieve some optimal combination of increases and 
decreases of these indices (United Nations, 1973). This approach has, in recent 
years, also spawned an industry of seekers after comparable indices related to 
mental illness, crime, old age, educational attainment and other, similar social 
planning topics. The search for a statistical model to model performance of 
American society goes back at least to the New Deal (Bauer, 1963 
Then, there is the physical determinist approach apparent to one degree or 
another in city planning as well as in various approaches to combating the urban 
crisis, inner city blight and other urban conditions. The essence of this approach is 
the assumption that the physical environments in which people live their daily lives 
– housing streets and roadways, transportation facilities, proximity of public 
services and other similar physical conditions and circumstances are primary 
factors in what is termed “the quality of life” of groups and communities (C.f., 
Bailey, 1975). 
A third service output approach found both in the public and independent• 
sectors today is sometimes also called social welfare planning. It is characterized by 
a unique and limited interpretation of the successful completion of planning. 
Regardless of the input problem with which it begins, this particular form of 
planning can be relied upon to result in a set of recommendations for the creation of 
professionally and bureaucratically organized services.  
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Each of these approaches to social planning is an organized and politically 
supported reality in American public life today. Economic planning attendant to 
social as well as purely fiscal and monetary concerns is predominantly a national 
concern with some state and regional efforts. Urban planning is predominantly a 
municipal and metropolitan concern, although important national interests and 
federal agencies, particularly the Department of Housing and Urban Development 
are also oriented in this direction. Social welfare planning was, for several decades 
until the Great Society era principally voluntary, federated action in major urban 
centers and a relatively small number of other smaller cities.  
The collective record of achievement of these diverse forms of social planning in 
the United States during the past two decades is by general agreement not an awe-
inspiring one (Goodman, 1972). Despite the growth and proliferation of 
organizations and professionals claiming to do social planning, one is hard-pressed 
to find much convincing evidence of effective performance on the one criterion which 
counts most – the solution or resolution of defined social problems.  
Increasing awareness of the modest achievement of efforts at what is currently 
termed planned social change, has generated a variety of reactions among planners 
and supporters of social planning. Many former academic and political supporters 
have simply lost interest in public and community affairs, including planning, and 
gone on to other pursuits. Some others have rejected gradualism and turned to 
political activism and self-styled radicalism. Some of the most avid supporters of 
social planning during the 1960s have turned cynical while the truly devoted can be 
heard calling for rededication and redoubling of effort. Assessments of the 
difficulties are many and variety. However, it appears to have occurred to relatively 
few people interested in planning that the basic difficulty with recent efforts at 
social planning may be due to a basic, thoroughgoing failure to adequately conceive 
of and deal with the subject matter of such planning – the complex, indeterminate 
and often illogical patterns of observable human behavior and human social 
relations.  
The principal thesis of this paper is that the inadequacies of recent efforts at 
social planning are essential failures of theory, rather than failures of practice. 
Economic, land use and social welfare planners it is suggested have all shared a 
common unwillingness or inability to abandon commitments to an essentially 
utilitarian rhetoric of reasoned behavior, wherein means are matched with ends, 
persons are viewed as essentially self-interested and goal-directed rational problem 
solvers operating on schedules of goal attainment known or predictable by the 
planners In such formulations, relatively little room is left for caprice, fancy, 
inconsistency, emotion, playfulness, myth, uncertainty, personal preference or the 
myriad other human dimensions of real life. Small wonder in retrospect that the 
track record of social planning has been so bad. It is entirely believable that it could 
have been – and might yet be – even worse.  
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We are, at this juncture, faced with several discernable futures for social 
planning. One option is to simply abandon the idea entirely as impractical. Like 
human powered flight or perpetual motion, planning social relations may be an 
unobtainable, even undesirably, ideal. The second possibility is the more likely: the 
facts of bureaucratic and interest group politics make it extremely likely that the 
current social planning ventures alluded to above can continue to operate for the 
foreseeable future on the genteel fiction that some as yet unspecified good will come 
of it all; that in planning we may eventually learn to plan. To avoid either of these 
futures it would be essential for planners to become more sophisticated in the 
theoretical implications of human behavior; not just the behavior of their clients 
and “subject matters” but also of themselves. It is my contention that symbolic 
interactionism offers the greatest contemporary potential for achieving a useful, 
humane and workable theoretical approach to social planning.  
Much has been published on the allegedly face-to-face biases of symbolic 
interactionism, its insensitivity to social conflict and other dark sides of humankind, 
and its essentially indeterminate, unpredictable model of the species (Hanson & 
Wilke, 1978; Maines, 1977). All of these factors appear at first glance to make a 
strong case against the usefulness of interaction theory in planning contexts. Yet to 
argue in this direction too vigorously can readily put one in the position of refusing 
to own a calendar with summer months because one doesn’t like hot weather. The 
utility of concepts is not the only consideration to be taken into account in planning 
practice if it is to be grounded in knowledge. Some question of the degree to which 
concepts “fit” the known facts must also be a major consideration, and I believe that 
such fit is one of the strongest arguments that can be made for the application of 
interactionist concepts to planning theory. The alleged micro bias of interactionism 
may be an appropriate dose of realism after years of assuming the supposed 
advantages and potentials of grandiose planned structural change come to naught.  
I propose to examine in the remainder of this paper some of the key concepts 
found in the work of selected early interactionists as a partial first step toward 
bringing greater communication between them and social planners. My findings are 
modest but I believe they generally support the possibilities of the interactionist 
approach for social planning. In what follows I refer to aspects of the writings of 
John Dewey, George Herbert Mead, W.I. Thomas and related expressions by E. W. 
Burgess and Harry Stack Sullivan. Together, I believe one can find in the works of 
these intellectuals as well as in the work of several of their contemporaries in the 
Chicago schools of architecture, sociology and philosophy the basis for a social 
planning approach with substantial implications for contemporary planning 
practice.  
John Dewey 
It is difficult even today to fully come to terms with the written work of John 
Dewey. Yet it is equally difficult to escape the conclusion that much of the fabric of 
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contemporary social science and social practice has an essentially Deweyan cast to 
it. Social experimentation, kindergartens, and day care, the evaluation of social 
programs by their effects and consequences, and the striving for relevance by recent 
philosophers and scientists all can be linked to this quintessential American 
philosopher (Lawson, 1971; McDermott, 1973). 
Most important of all, it would seem, the Deweyan problem-solving model first 
presented in How We Think (Dewey, 1910), particularly in its more extended forms 
of problem definition, identification of alternatives, gathering of evidence, review of 
alternatives, selection of preferred options and the various stages of implementation 
and evaluation, forms the very core of social planning practice theory (Kahn, 1969B; 
Mayer, 1972; Mayer, Moroney & Morris, 1974; U.N Commission, 1973). 
Also, in The Public and Its Problems (1927), Dewey stressed the importance of 
discussion, consultation, persuasion and debate in democratic decision-making. 
Each of these has the potential to extend and deepen awareness of the problems 
under consideration in planning and help those engaged in social planning to 
deeper insight into social situations and potentialities. 
To even attempt to do justice to all of Dewey’s other views related to planning 
would require far more extensive treatment than is possible here. However, it is 
possible to identify certain characteristically Deweyan concepts which are 
particularly apt to the reformulation of planning theory called for above, and to cite 
a number of works by Deweyan which warrant further investigation for that 
purpose.  
I have chosen three ideas which strike me as particularly appropriate for 
planning, at the same time passing by the most obvious possibilities in the repeated 
calls for the fusion of science and practice and the stress upon science and 
democracy. The first of these is the pragmatic theory of the nature of mental 
activity and its relation to experience dealt with not only by Dewey in his concept of 
creative intelligence but also by Peirce, James, Mead and more recently by Alfred 
Schutz and other pragmatists. A major problem with existing planning theory, it 
can be argued, is its Enlightenment rationalist conception of Mind as the producer 
of a symphony of syllogisms which together make up “rational” thought.  
For example, Dewey might as well have been addressing a contemporary group 
of social planners when he wrote: 
. . . In social matters, those who claim that they are 
in possession of the one sure solution of social 
problems often set themselves up as being peculiarly 
scientific while others are floundering around in an 
‘emperical’ morass. Only recognition in both theory 
and practice that ends to be attained (ends-in-view) 
are of the nature of hypotheses and that hypotheses 
 5 
have to be formed and tested in strict correlativity 
with existential conditions as means, can alter 
current habits of dealing with social issues. 
(McDermott, 1973, 407) 
In fact, the standard practice in planning today runs directly contrary to this 
advice in several respects. First of all, there is a rather naïve faith that in many 
social problem areas scientific research will one day reveal what Dewey calls “the 
one sure solution.” Also, the suggestion here that ends or goals are selected in light 
of means and themselves hypothetical in nature runs contrary to the approach of 
most planning. What this approach suggests, more than anything else, is the 
critical importance of the initial stage of planning operations – defining the problem 
– while leaving room for continued reformulations in light of on-going reality testing 
(Edelman, 1977). In the face of such “obviously” defined problems as poverty, 
inadequate housing, urban blight and aging, social planners have shown a marked 
unwillingness to proceed with their inquiries in the manner Dewey suggests and a 
marked penchant to attend principally to the au currant set of received “sure 
solutions”. Closer attention to the actions involved in defining the problem rather 
than accepting standard definitions, therefore, must be one central element in the 
reformulation of social planning theory.  
Also apparent through Dewey as well as the other pragmatists is a sense of 
future that is open-ended and yet capable of offering direction to human affairs 
without locking them into end state utopias. Contemporary social planning practice 
has been essentially unable to resolve the dilemmas of ideology and utopia, but 
rather than facing the issue most social planning practice employs a variety of 
dodges and ploys to avoid entirely the question of the future. Most notable in that 
regard is the idea of short-term planning. 
Further, planning and perhaps all of the social professions can learn much from 
Dewey regarding the essentially false dichotomizing of theory and practice One 
suspects, for example, that most practitioners would concur with Dewey that 
“theory separated from concrete doing and making is empty and futile.”  
One can speculate, however, on whether they would hold in equal regard the 
remainder of the quotation:  
Practice (separated from theory) then becomes an 
immediate seizure of opportunities and enjoyments 
which conditions afford without the direction which 
theory – knowledge and ideas – has power to supply. 
The problem of the relation of theory and practice is 
not a problem of theory alone; it is that, but it is also 
the most practical problem of life. For it is the question 
of how intelligence may inform action, and how action 
may bear fruit of increased insight into meaning; a 
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clear view of the values that are worthwhile and of the 
means by which they are to be made secure in 
experienced objects (McDermott, 1973, 595) 
In its understandings of social relations, contemporary social planning is, 
indeed, largely “an immediate seizure of opportunities and enjoyments.”  Further,  
this statement identifies the truly central practice issue of social planning: that of 
how intelligence may be employed to inform action. It is possible to speculate on 
this basis that far from being an organized bureaucratic program of activities as in 
present efforts, truly effective social planning is a quality of institutional leadership 
– the quality of bringing intelligence to bear upon institutional action. Thus, while 
some measure of power or influence may well be a necessary pre-requisite to 
effective planning, it can be no guarantee. Powerful planners unable to bring 
knowledge to bear should not be expected to differ in any appreciable way from 
other powerful bureaucrats.  
Finally, there is it seems great potential for social planning in exploration of 
Dewey’s notion of experience as aesthetic. His statement on celebrations are easily 
trivialized into counter cultural cant about “peak experiences” McDermott, 1973, 
300). However, social planning per se has been almost totally oblivious to the full 
range of aesthetic dimensions in the experience affected by planning. Evidence from 
the pea-green walls of welfare department offices and hallways to the behemoth 
complexes of public housing support this conclusion in the most obvious and direct 
ways. Far subtler and more profound ramifications about as well. For example, the 
denial of novel or fresh experiences in the planned environments of institutions.  
In sum, social planning theorists would do well to re-read John Dewey expecting 
to find therein much beyond problem solving that is new and fresh as well as the old 
and familiar ideas.  
George Herbert Mead 
At the heart of the called-for reconstruction of social planning theory in light of 
symbolic interactionism is the seminal work of George H. Mead (Mead, 1934). A 
good many planners can be counted upon never to have heard of Mead, while others 
will think immediately of his “I-Me” concept and pass on. Therefore, clear and 
concise presentation of Mead’s perspective are the most essential elements in 
whatever case can be made for symbolic interaction in social planning. The 
interpretation of Mead’s work here generally follows the approach of Herbert 
Blumer that people act in situations on the basis of the meanings those situations 
have for them. The importance of this assumption for social planning cannot be 
overstated. If one is to plan for future behavior sufficiently specific and detailed 
information regarding both the situation (as viewed by the planners) and the points 
of view of the participants are essential. I will not attempt to be exhaustive here, 
but only to highlight certain standard interactionist concepts drawn from Mead and 
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concentrate upon the central significance of Mead’s formulation of personal and 
social reconstruction with particular reference to the third group of planners noted 
above.  
As with Dewey’s concepts of problem-solving and intelligence, there is much to 
be gained for planning theory from careful consideration of Mead’s concept of Mind 
(Mead, 1934, 42-134). Particularly noteworthy would seem to be the processual and 
emergent nature of mental activity. A somewhat more complex matter to sort out 
are the implications for planning of Mead’s reflexive concepts of self and other – 
particularly with reference to the reflexive relation between “the planner” and her 
significant others, including client groups and client populations.  
Another fundamental contribution from Mead to social planning would come 
from substitution of Mead’s model of meaningful action for the naïve empiricism 
and crude behaviorism which underlie too many planning efforts. As a start, 
planners could learn to distinguish between behavioral events and the meanings 
those events have for participants and the meanings they have for planners. Mead’s 
approach goes right to the heart of both the problem of social control by planners 
and the problem of the effectiveness of planning. What the Meadian model implies 
is that, far from “scripting” or in other ways directly seeking to control the behavior 
of real people, social planning should be aimed at anticipating the meanings that 
real people bring to specified situations, linking those meanings conceptually to 
certain situationally perceived difficulties or problems, and seeking for effective, 
realistic and legally and ethically justifiable ways of redefining those situations 
together with the participants.  
In the long run, the most fruitful concepts for planning purposes may turn out to 
be Mead’s approaches to time and the future, which will not be dealt with here, and 
the concept of the generalized other (Mead, 1934, 227-336). One of the few 
concessions to any twentieth century social theory in the fundamentally eighteenth 
century Enlightenment outlook of planning theory has been the adoption of a 
functionalist conception of society as some organic unity binding together members 
of the nation’s population. This usage of “American society” as a key reference point 
typically accentuates the fact of common citizenship and continental proximity and 
ignores the “local” complexities of group affiliations, personally defined social worlds 
and the subtleties and nuances of the daily lives and world views of ordinary people, 
is commonplace in social planning discussions. Further this approach is typically 
accompanied by personification and anthropomorphizing of “society” (as in “society’s 
needs” or “society’s preferences”) the authoritarian political implications of which 
are only dimly perceived among social planners.  
One suspects in this context that most social planners will have a devilishly 
difficult time coming to grips with the idea of society from the standpoint of the 
person inherent in Mead’s concept of the generalized other. It may appear idle 
pedantry to suggest to such practical people that “society” in the sense of a national 
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organic unity is a mythic construct of epic proportions beyond all hope of empirical 
verification. However, the effort should be made for several reasons. 
Attempting to deal with any known social problems in terms of its implications 
for “society” introduces a level of unreality and a profound dilemma to planning 
from the very start. No living person is capable of dealing with society in this sense 
in anything near its potential complexities, and when simplified to understandable 
terms, it quickly loses its utility.  
By contrast Mead’s view of “society as generalized other” both complicates and 
refines the use of the concept in planning. For example, planners and other social 
practitioners have become very adept at using certain mythical construction of the 
values and attitudes of society in setting standards for normal or expected behavior 
– often with highly questionable and even shocking results. The prospect of 
abandoning this approach in favor of more clearly identifying the significant others 
in question are not high at the moment.  
However, it is possible to outline a method based on Mead to deal with some of 
the difficulty. By three simple operations, the planner can reduce the problem of 
society to empirical, manageable terms. The first operation would be to select a 
“reference person” – either the planner, a client, or an ideal-typical representative 
member of the planning team or the client group. Through a combination of 
empirical investigation, participant-observation and imaginative role-taking, the 
planner/analyst should be able to identify major elements that define the “society” 
involved in terms of the significant others to whom the referent person relates 
directly or symbolically. (Note these may be direct relations or purely role-taking or 
some combination.) Thus, a public welfare planner can, using this procedure 
identify not only welfare workers and clients but also the significant others to whom 
members of each of these groups customarily relate and also relate to symbolically. 
Thus, welfare caseworkers ordinarily have little direct interaction with state 
legislators individually or collectively. However, state legislators with the power of 
the purse are most certainly among the significant others of most welfare workers 
and consequently an important part of their social world.  
The principal import of the generalized other for social planning, in other words, 
is to enforce a higher level of empirical analysis and investigation upon planning 
that is often the case at present. Research has shown over and over that one cannot 
blithely assume that persons “in the same society” – even those living next door to 
one another – are in any meaningful sense cohabitants of a common social world. I 
suspect that the mistaken observations resulting from this shared society 
assumption could be systematically linked with a number of the deficiencies of 
recent planning ventures.  
A closely related element of the soil planning approach to the concept of society 
has been an essentially functionalist assumption that social structures control to 
some unstated degree the behavior of their incumbents. Because it has obvious and 
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predictable uses in designing intervention strategies social planners have, in short, 
been ready and willing to adopt what Dennis Wrong calls “the over-socialized 
conception of man.” In so doing, they have generated for themselves great 
difficulties in now allowing room for freedom of choice, individual behavioral 
deviations or other forms of serendipity.  
By contrast, one finds in reading Mead an essential reciprocity of person and 
social structure: 
Human society, we have insisted, does not merely 
stamp the pattern of its organized behavior upon 
any of its individual members, so that this pattern 
becomes likewise the pattern of the individual’s 
self; it also, at the same time, gives him a mind, as 
the means or ability of consciously conversing with 
himself in terms of the social attitudes which 
constitute the structure of his self and which 
embody the pattern of human society’s organized 
behavior as reflected in that structure. And his 
mind enables him to stamp the pattern of his 
further developing self (further developing through 
his mental activity) upon the structure of 
organization of human society, and thus in a degree 
to reconstruct and modify in terms of his self the 
general pattern of social or group behavior in terms 
of which his self was originally constituted (Mead, 
1934, 270; italics added.) 
Among the many threats and insights stemming from this approach is the novel 
(for planning) question of which redirection of planned change can one anticipate 
from those most affected by the change? There are numerous empirical examples of 
this such as another pathway to the concept of informal organization is explicitly 
recognized by formal organization researchers as the actual departures from the 
formal organization as a plan. Research by Anselm Strauss, et. al. has extended this 
notion to the very core of organizational order (Strauss, 1964). From a social 
behavioral standpoint, in other words, the informal organization is the natural 
order of social relations in such settings, and all formal organizations must be 
expected to come to terms with it. Similar examples of unplanned redirection of 
planning efforts abound and yet systematic efforts to predict or anticipate such 
redirections have never been explicitly recognized in social planning theory or 
practice.  
One of the major implications of Mead for social planning of the social welfare 
type noted at the beginning is his direct, dialectical assault on what has been one of 
the longest standing and most divisive distinctions: the division of labor between 
reformers seeking institutional change and therapists or counselors seeking 
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improvements in the human condition through individual interventions. In general, 
these are viewed in social work and other human service fields as essentially 
divisive, alternative approaches to social problem solving. In Mead, however, the 
conclusion is inescapable that the two are not only related but aspects of the same 
process:  
The relations between social reconstruction and self 
or personality reconstruction are reciprocal and 
internal or organic; social reconstruction by the 
individual members or any organized human 
society entails self or personality reconstruction in 
some degree or other by each of these individuals 
and vice versa; for, since their selves or 
personalities are constituted by their organized 
social relations to one another, they cannot 
reconstruct those selves or personalities without 
also reconstruction, to some extent, the given social 
order, which is, likewise, constituted by their 
organized social relations to one another. In both 
types of reconstruction the same fundamental 
material or organized social relations among 
human individuals is involved and is simply 
treated in different ways, or from different angles 
or points of view, in the two cases respectively; or in 
short, social reconstruction and self or personality 
reconstruction are the two sides of a single process – 
the process of human social evolution. (Mead, 1964, 
264; italics added) 
The Meadian concept of mind is similarly reciprocal for external social and 
internal mental events, which suggests yet another fruitful avenue for explanation 
and development. Some planners have been much concerned over the question of 
whether the planner mentally works out a plan and then sells it to clients and 
constituencies or merely carries out the wishes of those constituents in organizing a 
plan conforming to their demands. That both may be involved is a rather mundane 
observation and yet a practice rhetoric for expressing such reciprocity has proven 
elusive. This can be handled quite readily by the interactionist concept of self and 
its relation to significant others.  
Finally, close scrutiny of the latter of Mead’s famous trilogy – society – brings 
into sharper focus one question which is crucial for assessing the planning relevance 
of his work. According to critics there is in Mead and the interactionism that grew 
from his work a thoroughgoing inability to recognize and adequately deal with 
human conflict. If this were so it truly would argue against the usefulness of Mead’s 
perspective since conflict, partisanship and divisiveness are routine aspects of the 
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work of most planning. A close reading of Mead’s comments on society, however, 
raises some intriguing evidence against this prevailing criticism: 
The fundamental socio-physiological impulses or behavior 
tendencies which are common to all human individuals, 
which lead those individuals collectively to enter or form 
themselves into organized societies or social communities, 
and which constitute the ultimate basis of those societies 
or social communities, fall, from the social point of view, 
into two main classes: those which lead to social 
cooperation and those which lead to social antagonism 
among individuals. They can be described as those which 
give rise to friendly attitudes and relations and those 
which give rise to hostile attitudes and relations among 
human individuals implicated in the social situations 
(Mead, 1964, 268) 
This is hardly the consensus view one often hears attributed to Mead. Might it 
be merely a fluke? A few pages further on, he continues:  
A highly developed and organized human society is one in 
which the individual members are interrelated in a 
multiplicity of different intricate and complicated ways 
whereby they all share a number of common interests – 
interests in, and for the betterment of, society – and yet, 
on the other hand are more or less in conflict relative to 
numerous other interest which they possess only 
individually or else share with one another in small or 
limited groups (Mead, 1964, 265) 
He also injects a Simmel-like note in differentiating ethical and broader 
connotations of social and anti-social tendencies: 
Now it is true that the latter class of fundamental 
impulses or behavior in human beings are “anti-social” 
insofar as they would, by themselves, be destructive of all 
human social organization or could not, alone constitute 
the basis of organized human society; yet in the broadest 
and strictest non-ethical sense, they are obviously no less 
social than are the former class of such impulses or 
behavior tendencies. (Mead, 1964, 279) 
Further, Mead makes clear in his discussion of society that accommodation of 
conflicting interests and growing social consensus on directions results from 
communication and role-taking. However, he very carefully points out that 
 12 
individual interests do not have to be subsumed or merged in order for the process 
of accommodation to work:  
A member of the community is not necessarily like other 
individuals because he is able to identify himself with 
them. He may be different. There can be a common 
content, common experience, without there being an 
identity of function. A difference of function does not 
preclude a common experience; it is possible for the 
individual to put himself in the place of the other 
although his function is different from the other (Mead, 
1964, 279) 
Indeed, were such role-taking not, in fact, possible the very idea of planning 
would be nonsensical. 
The potential for a fruitful merger of social planning and symbolic interaction 
rests on the implications of the work of George H. Mead in modifying certain key 
planning concepts. Some of this modification is already underway, albeit largely 
within the rhetorical bounds of classic utilitarian political and economic terminology 
(Friedmann, 1972). Any effort to transcend that perspective will require some 
initiatives on the part of those with an interactionist point of view and with more 
than the casual awareness of Mead accorded most students in planning programs. 
W.I. Thomas 
A third early interactionist whose work contains interactionist concepts relevant 
to social planning theory is W(illiam) I(saac) Thomas, who is best known, perhaps, 
for his widely-quoted situational definition of reality. Things that are seen as real by 
individuals or groups, Thomas observed, will be real in their consequences (Thomas 
& Janowitz, 1966). This expression, it needs to be noted, is part of a larger fabric of 
Thomas’ research and thought which is far more relevant to contemporary social 
planning concerns than is ordinarily acknowledged. His treatment, for example, of 
situational analysis was influenced by early casework thought in social work, and 
provides a contemporary beginning point for the mediation of “reform” and 
“therapy” noted above.  
Over and beyond situations, however, Thomas’ work on “Social Disorganization 
and Reorganization,” “Social Personality” and his essay “Rational Control in Social 
Life” all contain important suggestions of immediate significance for social 
planning. (Note: Copies of each of these together with Thomas’ consequentialist 
definition of reality noted above are all included in the collection of Thomas’ writings 
edited by Morris Janowitz cited above.) 
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For example, when writing on social reorganization Thomas is touching on what 
more recent social planning theorists such as Binstock, Morris, Mayer, Rein and 
Moroney, et. al. term planned social change: 
The problem of social reconstruction is to create new 
schemes of behavior – new rules of personal conduct and 
new institutions – which will supplant or modify the old 
schemes and correspond better to the changed attitudes, 
that is, which will permit the latter to express themselves 
in action and at the same time will regulate their active 
manifestations so as not only to prevent the social group 
from beginning disorganized but to increase its cohesion 
by opening new fields for social cooperation (Thomas & 
Janowitz, 1966, 8).   
As a statement of the problem of planned social change, this statement 
published in 1927 may be at least as clear and concise than many comparable later 
comments.  
In “Rational Control in Social Life,” Thomas identifies what remain today some 
of the most essential intervention skills and problems of social practice: 
While our realization that nature can be controlled only 
by treating it as independent of any immediate act of our 
will or reason is four centuries old, our confidence in 
‘legislation’ and in ‘moral suasion’ shows that this idea is 
not yet generally realized with regard to the social world 
(Thomas & Janowitz, 1966, 38) 
He goes on to identify “ordering and forbidding” as the oldest form of social 
technique, and to equate it with primitive, magical thinking. Such ordering and 
forbidding, in the guise of the formulation of authoritative social policy, 
bureaucratic rules and guidelines continues to be quite possibly the most widely 
used and supported intervention strategies in social planning today.  
Thomas goes on: 
There are two other fallacies involved to a certain extent 
in social practice, although practical sociology has already 
repudiated them. Th reason for their persistence in 
practice is that even if the erroneousness of the old 
assumption has been recognized, no new working ideas 
have been put in their place. These assumptions are: (1) 
that men react in the same way to the same influences 
regardless of their individual or social past, and that 
therefore it is possible to provoke identical behavior in 
various individuals by identical means; (2) that men 
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develop spontaneously, without external influence 
tendencies which enable them to profit in a full and 
uniform way under given conditions, and therefore it is 
sufficient to creat favorable or remove unfavorable 
conditions in order to give birth to or suppress given 
tendencies (Thomas & Janowitz, 1966, 47) 
The second of these, of course, is commonly repudiated in research on welfare 
clients, aged and retarded persons, mental patients and many others. However, in 
planning practice what this usually comes down to in practice is substitution of the 
research-based norm for some previously adduced one Even in the face of 
overwhelmingly sophisticated statistical procedures, however, planners seem 
currently no more able than they were in Thomas’ time to avoid the first fallacy.  
E.W. Burgess 
The most explicit discussion of social planning among the group of 
interactionists considered in this paper is found in E(rnest) W. Burgess’ essay 
“Social Planning and the Mores.” This paper was published as the lead article in a 
special (and currently unavailable) publication of the American Sociological 
Association, co-edited by Burgess and Herbert Blumer2, titled Human Problems of 
Social Planning. In his article Burgess examines the interplay of individualism, 
democracy and humanitarianism. While the article is largely a topical discussion of 
principally historical interest, Burgess’ conclusions are noteworthy in their 
implications for contemporary social planning: 
Three conditions seem necessary for the success of 
an American type of social planning. The first of 
these is that social planning proceed within the 
traditional framework of a free society in which the 
values of individualism and democracy are 
preserved, nurtured and extended. . . The second 
prerequisite for the success of an American type of 
social planning is a complete and thoroughgoing 
restatement of the conceptions of individualism, 
democracy and humanitarianism. . . with reference 
not to the pioneer period but to the realities of an 
urban and technical civilization. The third 
condition for the success of social planning in 
America is to secure participation of specialists and 
technicians in the undertaking, but in their proper 
functioning. (Burgess & Bogue, 1974, 28) 
                                                        
2 Blumer, who is not included in this discussion, is widely regarded as the earliest sociological interpreter 
of the work of George Herbert Mead within the tradition of symbolic interactionism.  
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The importance of these sentiment lies less in whether or not one concurs with 
them today than it does in their heuristic value for discussions about planning 
between interactionists. Judging by the literature, one suspects that current 
generations of intereactionists ae likely to react with varying degrees of 
amusement, bewilderment and outrage at them. However, it is also highly probably 
that if asked to produce a statement of the basic values underlying contemporary 
social planning, most planners would produce a remarkably similar list. These 
continue to be dominant elements in the rhetoric of public affairs to which planners 
are continuously exposed, and any effort to come to terms with social planning 
cannot dismiss thm. There is, therefore, a full agenda for symbolic interactionism to 
reexamine these three ideas in light of existing research and theory, not with an eye 
toward dismissing them but rather in order to clarify, elaborate and modify their 
usefulness.  
Harry Stack Sullivan 
Another dimension of the potential contribution of interactionism to social 
planning, and a further element in the union of reform and theory noted above is 
found in the writings of Harry Stack Sullivan. Both Mead, a philosopher, and 
Sullivan, a psychiatrist, have been attributed by various sources with reformulating 
important aspects of the classical Freudian psychoanalytic approach to mental 
disturbances. Recent work of Thomas Szasz, Scheff, LeMert and many others has 
brought further synthesis to the social and psychoanalytic approaches which 
Sullivan is often credited with pioneering. Sullivan’s work in outlining an 
interpersonal theory of psychiatry built around situationally generated anxiety and 
the resultant need for what he termed “security operations” proved to be a major 
factor in shifting perspectives on this subject.  
There is nother dimension of Sullivan’s work which exists only in very sketchy 
form but which should be of interest to social planners. At several points in his 
published work, but most clearly in “Toward a Psychiatry of Peoples”, there is to be 
found a clearly stated mission for a socially-aware social planning: 
The thinking out of constructive, functionally coherent 
revisions of any of the major cultures of the world, so that 
the personal imperatives which derive from it – whether 
in the obscure, very early inculcated, patterns of 
conscience or the subsequently acquired, less recondite 
patterns of acceptable rationalizations of potent 
verbalisms – shall be less restrictive on understanding 
and more permissive of social progress; that, truly is a 
task to which unnumbered groups of the skillful might 
well apply themselves (Sullivan, 1953, 383) 
Part of the contemporary network of social planning existing in the United 
States today is federally mandated mentl health planning underwritten by the 
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National Institute of Mental Health. Unfortunately, like their close associates in 
health planning, virtually all of these current ventures have operationalized their 
mandate in terms of only one of the three options mentioned at the beginning above 
– concern for suicide rates, hospital mission rates and other mental health 
statistics; concern with the location and design of physical facilities and concern for 
creating new and additional mental health services largely overwhelm Sullivan’s 
suggestion for “thinking out of constructive, functionally coherent revisions”. Just as 
importantly mental health planning to ate appears not to have come to grips in any 
substantial way with the challenges and possibilities posed by the growing body of 
sociological research – much of it done by contemporary interactionists like Glaser 
and Strauss, Irving Goffman and other interactionists, or with the role of social 
institutions on the personal imperatives of the mentally distressed. In fact, 
planning in this area appears in most instnces to be well behind therapy and 
counseling.  
Conclusion 
It would be possible to extend this investigation a great deal further both in 
examining more closely the seminal concepts of those mentioned – Dewey, Mead, 
Thomas, Burgess and Sullivan – and in adding numerous additional names to the 
roster of these. Carey’s recent discussion of the Chicago School makes fascinating 
reading along these lines and argues for the addition of Robert Park, Louis Wirth 
and others (Carey, 1977). Likewise looking just outside the conventional 
interactionist and sociological pantheon, one can find relevant discussions relating 
to planning in the works of Frank Lloyd Wright and his mentor, Louis Sullivan, 
Jane Addams and settlement house leaders, the institutional economists, 
particularly John R. Commons and others.  
What can we say about social planning based on this brief foray? First, we can 
suggest that interactionism and particularly the view of mental effort found in 
Mead suggests that planning is not primarily the rational problem-solving process 
it is presented as in existing planning theory. It is, instead, primarily effort to 
construct publicly meaningful action, or what Dewey terms “intelligent action.” 
Planners have no monopoly on right reason, and planning appears to be no more-or-
less-end-oriented than dozens of other forms of human behavior. The focus on goals 
analysis and priorities assessment in the typical planning context can also be seen 
as essentially rhetorical devices of a particular type: Aimed at building rationales 
identifying and justifying future courses of what Mead in the interpretation of 
Blumer, terms “joint lines of action” and testing varying rationales for their 
consequences. One of the unique aspects of planning is that such testing of 
alternatives is, most typically an entirely imaginative, role-taking enterprise. 
Realistically, the question of how logical one must be in planning, or in how closely 
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means are connected to ends is a derivative issue rather than the central one.3 
Conceivably, one could proceed in a highly irrational manner (in the standard 
planning sense) and still yield meaningful results.  
Additional support for an interactionist perspective comes from the often-
conflicting points of view with which the planner must contend. How is one to 
achieve a “rational” solution to a problem differently defined by several factions on a 
public body such as a city council or legislative body? In such situations there is 
undoubtedly a strong negotiated order element in planning, even at the level of 
defining the problem. In the conventional approaches, “rational planning” involves 
nothing less than achieving consensus on a single definition of the problem – either 
interest rates and taxes are so high that landlords cannot adequately maintain 
their housing, or poorly maintained housing has negative effects for tenants. 
However, the conventional approach to rationality appears to considerably 
understand human capacities for mental and verbal activity. 
There is no reason that adequate planning could not proceed simultaneously 
with both definitions of the problem as stated, while adding a few additional 
elements (like declining city tax revenues and relationships between the two as it 
goes along (if, for instance, assessment of alternatives reveals the two definitions of 
the situations to be fundamentally incompatible and irreconcilable, that conclusion 
two becomes a part of the definition of the problem.) 
Unfortunately, in contemporary social planning practice the solution is too often 
found in offering up simple lists of possibilities. Lists of goals and objectives, 
numbered serially are often confused for their heuristic value in facilitating actual 
planning and their rhetorical value in talking about the results of planning.  
Secondly, it can be suggested based on the view of planning as the construction 
of publicly-meaningful action, that the rational problem-solving process of setting 
goals, defining problems, identifying and weighing alternative, is not a particularly 
adequate formulation of planning method. One may plan, for example, without ever 
attending to one or more of these in any degree. The essence of social planning 
method from an interactionist perspective involves intentional taking of the role of 
the generalized other in order to predict or estimate to the fullest extent possible 
the range of consequences resulting from a plausible action. It is the centrality (and 
the difficulty of adopting this posture – the viewpoint of society – which explains the 
fascination of planners with the organic concept and personification of society, and 
also with measures of social control and consensus (e.g., Thomas’ “ordering and 
forbidding”). Conversely, it is the interactionist recognition of the possibility of 
assuming the role of the generalized other – even a divided and conflicted other – 
                                                        
3 One of John Dewey’s early publications, “The Reflect Arc Concept in Psychology” (1896), not 
considered here, offers a very early “systems feedback” perspective that raises the prospect that from an 
ongoing social perspective ends can logically precede means.  
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which underlies the previous statement about planning for two differing goals 
simultaneously.  
Finally, there is in the above materials the recognition that planning is not 
inherently a specialty skill, like brain surgery or macrame. At a profoundly 
significant level, one can conclude on the basis of reading Mead that virtually every 
human is capable of high levels of sophisticated planning. The difference between 
“professional planners” and others is principally an institutional rather than a 
person one. What is unique about social planning, for example, is not that it is an 
effort to resolve social problems by rational means. Social researchers and social 
philosophers also can be said to be able and willing to try that.  
Beyond the purely personal capabilities possessed in varying degree by all 
persons, planning is principally a quality of institutional leadership. For the 
planner, this poses three basic alternatives: one must either become an institutional 
leader, go to work for one or call out and develop leadership in others. In all cases, 
however, it is in harnessing mind to the guidance and direction of social institutions 
wherein the skill and accomplishment of planning are to be found. It is also in the 
political and organizational isolation of social planning outside such leadership, 
with no particularly apparent ways of training access and acceptance to which the 
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